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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JACK A. MILLIGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MELVIN COY HARWARD, 
KENNETH B. McDUFFY, 
and C. E. LINDSEY, 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 9121 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
To conform to the Preliminary Statement of the Ap-
pellant, throughout this brief plaintiff and appellant will 
be referred to as plaintiff, and defendants and respondents 
will be referred to as defendants. Further, all references 
are to the page numbers of the transcript of the trial and 
will be designated as ccTr." rather than to the renumbered 
pages of the record. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPO,RT A VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANTS, McDUFFY AND LINDSEY. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF 
RIDING WITH THE DRIVER HARWARD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO 
SUPPORT A VERDICT AGAINST THE DEFEND-
ANTS, McDUFFY AND LINDSEY. 
Exhibit uA," a photograph of a drawing on a black-
board, contained in plaintiff's brief, was never introduced 
in evidence and is not part of the record in this case. This 
drawing on the blackboard was used only for illustrative 
purposes. The testimony of Officer Iba, upon which the 
drawing is based so far as it relates to any measurements, 
was stricken from the record. Upon motion duly made by 
counsel for the defendants, McDuffy and Lindsey, the 
Court struck all testimony of measurements from the 
record. 
((MR. AADNESEN: First, your Honor has 
under advisement the motion that we made pre-
viously to strike the testimony of Officer Iba as it 
relates to the measurements which were made by 
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others, and we think that that motion should be 
considered now. 
((As your Honor will recall, he testified he 
did not make them; all he did was write them down. 
And on that basis, they are hearsay, no opportunity 
for us to cross-examine the officer as to the manner 
in which he made them, and his acts. 
((THE COURT: Well, the testimony as those 
measurements are strictly hearsay. The witness 
couldn't even say who it was that told him the dis-
tances, nor when or where. So that may be strick-
en." (Tr. 198) 
Plaintiff's counsel does not challenge this ruling in his 
brief nor on this appeal. 
Officer Iba also testified that the truck was properly 
parked. 
((A. Well, I don't remember what the measure-
ments was to the truck tires, but the truck was 
parked all right. I mean, as far as I can see, and I 
had the opinion of officers that the truck was pos-
sibly parked all right." 
((Q. Well, you have measured that little-
Could we do this fairly, and say that right along 
here (indicating)-
((A. Is the gutter. 
((Q. (Continuing) -is the gutter. And would 
it be fair to assume, from your observations and 
what you saw, that the right wheels of that truck 
were on that portion, near the curb? 
((A. Well, I wouldn't want to say. But I am 
satisfied in my own mind the truck was parked all 
right. 
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uQ. Well, if it had been parked farther out 
than that, you would have noticed it, wouldn't 
you? 
nA. Yes." (Tr. 26) 
nA. No. As I recall, the truck was parked all 
right. I mean-
uQ. Otherwise, you said you'd have said some-
thing about it, wouldn't you? 
uA. Possibly." (Tr. 27) 
* :!· :!· ::-
uA. I don't know actually what it is, but I 
imagine there would be 1 0 feet wider than the 
other two. Because any time a car stops and parks 
against that curb, it becames a parallel parking. 
And if there's no traffic there, why, they do use it 
as a traffic lane. Rather, I mean-
ceQ. Well, as a matter of fact, it's wide enough, 
that with a vehicle parked there-
nA. With a car there, you could still use it as 
a traffic lane. 
nQ. They can still use that lane, can't they? So 
in actuality, there were three traveled lanes, plus a 
parking lane, even though the parking lane itself, 
to the extreme right, is not marked. 
nA. That's right. There's no markings on the 
road itself. 
ceQ. When you observed the position of this 
car, as a matter of fact, Officer, that evening, and 
from that truck, it's a fact, isn't it, that the car in 
which the plaintiff was riding could have gone past 
this (indicating) and still stayed in that lane? 
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ccA. There was plenty a room, yes, sir." (Tr. 
28-29) 
Further, as the plaintiff points out in his brief, the 
right front of the automobile struck the left rear of the 
truck and the point of impact was barely a fraction of 
inches and had the driver of the automobile been a few 
inches further out in the street he would have missed the 
truck. The automobile was traveling north on State Street 
and the truck was par ked on the east side of the street. 
Officer Iba pointed out that even the plaintiff's car, which 
was located to the left rear and west of the truck after 
impact, was not in the traveled portion of the road. 
uQ. When you first saw the cars that were in-
volved-and I understand there won't be any ques-
tion but what there was the Harward automobile 
and the truck of Mr. Lindsey-what was the po-
sition of the Harward automobile; where, in rela-
tion to the traveled portion of the highway? 
uA. The Harward car was cocked to one side. 
I mean, it wasn't directly straight into the back end 
of the truck; it was cocked to one side, like it had 
shifted after the impact. 
ceQ. was it in the traveled portion of the high-
way, the Harward car? 
uA. No, it was over, I imagine a little further 
to the east." (Tr. 10-11) 
We submit that there is absolutely no evidence what-
soever in the record which could support any contention 
that the truck was parked in violation of the statute. The 
Court graphically summarized this as follows: 
uTHE COURT: I listened to the evidence 
that's been introduced here very carefully, and 
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critically, made rather copious notes on it, and I 
cannot find a thing in the record, not a word, that 
states or indicates in any way that this truck was 
not properly and lawfully parked. That eleven-foot 
measurement is not in the record, it's been stricken 
because there is no foundation on which to admit 
it, and all the other evidence as to the truck, and 
mention of it, nowhere is there any-not a word 
that I can find in the record, that the truck was not 
legally and lawfully parked. I am certain there isn't 
a word that it was more than 18 inches from the 
curb. There is some evidence that it's closer to the 
curb, and parallel to it, and that, in effect, is all the 
measurements there is with respect to its position, 
except that of Officer Iba, who said it was rightly 
and lawfully parked. 
uNow if anyone can point out to me any 
evidence in the record that shows that truck was not 
properly parked, I'd be quite interested in getting it. 
((Counsel have anything more? 
uMR. MIDGLEY: I have a motion, your 
Honor, aside from the one that is made. 
(tAre you going to rule on this prior motion at 
this time, or should I continue? 
uTHE COURT: If you have something you 
want to say, you have been silent through the argu-
ments of the rest of them. 
uMR. MIDGLEY: On behalf of the Defend-
ant Harward, we can't properly or logically resist 
the motion. 
uMR. KING: Well, your Honor, I don't know 
that the record shows our objection, but we stren-
uously object to the Court's striking from the 
record the measurements by Mr. Iba, in which he 
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participated as a part of a team. And if the Court 
does take that evidence out, of course, it knocks 
out the basic evidence we feel supports the proposi-
tion that the bus, or the truck was not properly 
parked. 
HMR. AADNESEN: Your Honor, I take it 
that my motion is granted at this time? 
((THE COURT: Yes, the motion of Mr. Mc-
Duffy and Mr. Lindsey, for a dismissal of the action 
on the grounds and assertions they included in the 
motion, is granted, and the action is dismissed for 
want of sufficient evidence to go to the jury or to 
the court for any other judgment." (Tr. 198-200) 
* * ::- * 
uNow, all the evidence in regard to that truck 
is that it was parked on the side of the road near 
the curb, outside of the painted lanes on what is 
known as the drainage lane or the gutter lane, 
which, by the law, is a parking lane where .cars and 
trucks may be parked. 
((The evidence is that this truck was so par ked, 
and within all the requirements of the statute; that 
it was while the car was so parked that the other 
car crashed into the back of it, which resulted in the 
damages done. But there is no evidence in the record 
from which a conclusion could be reached or found 
that there's anything in .connection with the truck, 
or the owners thereof, which in any way contrib-
uted to this accident. So there being no such thing 
for the jury to hunt for, and work at, there is 
nothing and no reason for sending the jury out to 
deliberate on something on which there is no evi-
dence or claim." (Tr. 202) 
Contrary to the testimony of the defendant Harward, 
Officer Iba testified that the defendant's lights were burn-
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ing on the truck at the time he arrived at the scene of the 
accident after it occurred. This becomes unimportant he-
cause all of the testimony in the case indicates that the 
vehicle could be seen beyond a distance of 5 00 feet on the 
highway and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
Officer Iba testified as follows: 
ceQ. Now, when you arrived, what direction 
did you come from? 
uA. I came from the south. I was heading 
north. 
ceQ. In the same direction that the plaintiff was 
going, is that right? 
ccA. Yes, sir. 
ceQ. Did you see some clearance lights on the 
truck? 
uA. I don't recall. 
ceQ. All right. Did you at any time? 
ccA. When I arrived there, I checked the truck 
to see-
ceQ. All right. Let me a~k you this: As you 
came up from the south, in this direction (indicat-
ing) , did you have any trouble seeing the truck? 
ccA. No, sir, no trouble. 
ceQ. All right. You knew right where the acci-
dent was, didn't you? 
ccA. Yes, sir. 
ceQ. And there are some railroad tracks back 
here (indicating) aren't there? 
((A. There's railroad tracks at 2200, I believe, 
south on State. There's about three, three tracks. 
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((Q. That go across the street. 
uA. Yes, sir. 
uQ. That would be somewhere down in this 
area (indicating) ? 
uA. Yes, sir. 
uQ. Roughly speaking. What is the lighting on 
that street? 
uA. It's well lit. It has the lights that burn till 
daylight every morning. 
uQ. Sodium vapor lights are they not? 
uA. Yes, sir. 
uQ. And tell me, there is a gas station across the 
street from there, isn't there? 
((A. Yes, sir. 
uQ. There's a restaurant just ahead of it aways. 
uA. Yes, sir. 
uQ. Isn't there also a motel right near where 
the accident happened? 
uA. There's a motel between the accident and 
the New China, I believe. 
uQ. Yes. In other words, somewhere in here 
(indicating) . 
uA. Yes. And there's another motel across the 
street to the west. 
uQ. Over here (indicating). 
uA. Yes. 
ceQ. And then there's a gas station here (in-
dicating). 
uA. Wasatch Avenue, in between the motel 
and the station. 
uQ. Is that a rather fully lighted gas station? 
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uA. It's open all night. 
((Q. Now, up this direction is 21st South, is 
that right? 
((A. Yes, sir. 
((Q. Is that a well lighted intersection? 
((A. Fairly well. lt's-
uQ. I take it, then, that the visibility is good in 
that area. 
((A. Well, it's-it's good visibility. I mean-
uQ. It's well lighted. 
((A. It was stormy that night. I mean, it had 
been raining but-
((Q. But the visibility was good? 
nA. The visibility was all right. 
((Q. And when you arrived at the scene of that 
accident, you made an observation, as you have pre-
viously said. The truck had clearance lights burning 
on rear and side. 
uA. That's, that's what I have on here, so that 
must have been the way it was. 
((Q. Well, as you recall it, there isn't any ques-
tion, is there? 
((A. No." (Tr. 32-34). 
((Q. Mr. Iba, just one or two more questions. 
When you arrived at the scene of the accident that 
night, you walked around in front of the truck first 
to see if anyone was hurt, it that right? 
((A. Yes. 
nQ. You saw nothing, is that correct? 
nA. Nothing. 
((Q. It was light enough for you to see in front 
of the truck, wasn't it? 
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teA. Yes, sir. 
teQ. And, as a matter of fact, isn't it true that 
in the very near vicinity of this truck, where it was 
parked, was a sodium vapor light (indicating)? 
etA. I believe it's up ahead. 
((Q. Just up ahead of it? 
teA. (Witness nods head in the affirmative.) 
((Q. And also one to the rear, from where you 
measured to the light pole, isn't it? 
etA. I can't remember. 
etQ. But at any rate, there was a light hanging 
over and close to that truck, just ahead of it. 
And, Mr. Iba, from the observations you made 
that night, from what you have seen, in considera-
tion of the weather and everything else, would you 
say you could see at least 500 feet ahead while you 
were driving down the street? 
teA. Well, I would say you'd have clear visi-
bility of the street with the lighting. 
etQ. Yes. And, as a matter of fact, an object as 
big as that truck, you could have seen it 500 feet 
away whether it was lighted or not, couldn't you? 
etA. Possibly." (Tr. 40-41) 
Finnegan, the passenger in the car riding in the back 
seat, also testified as to visibility and places the ability to 
see traffic on 21st South a distance of 1200 feet away. 
etQ. When you were riding in the back of the 
truck, or in the back of the automobile, you said 
you had the six packs of beer on the right-hand of 
you, is that right? 
teA. Right here on the right-hand side. (In-
dicating.) 
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uQ. And you were looking at the semaphore on 
21st South? 
uA. Looking at the traffic going by there. No 
semaphore. There was traffic lights going by there. 
ceQ. Down on 21st South? 
uA. 21st South, traffic. 
ceQ. That's about three blocks, isn't it? 
uA. No. 
uQ. Well, measured in city blocks. 
uA. I think it's about, maybe a block and a half 
from the scene of the accident. Two blocks you can 
:figure I was looking at them before he hit the truck. 
uQ. That's about it, huh, about two blocks? 
uA. Yes. 
ceQ. Now, when you use (blocks,' are you using 
the blocks down there, or what we normally call 
as a city block? 
ccA. Well, I go by the numbers. I think the 
Trucking Service is around 2200, or such a matter 
there. 
ceQ. 2200 would be-
ccA. I imagine it would be something like 22, 
2300, somewhere in there." (Tr. 79-80) 
* * * * 
ceQ. So then you are talking about a :figure of 
maybe a thousand, twelve hundred feet away. 
ccA. Well, I know that territory there. 
ceQ. You were looking at a point or distance 
down on 21st South, approximately 1200 feet away, 
down in this area (indicating)? 
((A. Yah." (Tr. 80-81) 
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POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK OF 
RIDING WITH THE DRIVER HARWARD. 
The Court properly held that the plaintiff assumed 
the risk in this case. Without stressing the intoxication of 
the defendant Harward, we submit that the intoxication 
and actions of the plaintiff, the other passenger, and the 
activities that night were adequately established by the 
record. Officer Iba took 35 or 40 cans of beer from the car. 
(Tr. 19). They had been drinking all evening and the 
testimony of Finnegan is conclusive as well as providing 
some measure of humor. He testified on cross-examination 
while being confronted with his deposition previously 
g1ven. 
uA. That's right. 
uMR. AADNESEN: On Pages, line 6. (Read-
ing) (Question: You didn't actually keep a count of 
the number of beers you had? 
cAnswer: No, but it was a period of about three 
hours. I would say we consumed, maybe, oh, maybe 
about eight beers, or ten, in the period of three 
hours.' 
uis that about right? 
uA. Six, eight, ten, I don't count them. 
uQ. Now, you say Mr. Milligan's condition was 
just fine. You've testified to that. Nothing wrong 
with him. 
uA. His condition? 
uQ. Yes-
uA. Yes. 
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HQ. And you drank drink for drink with him, 
except he had, what, about three more? Isn't that 
what you said? 
HA. No, I didn't say he had three more. I say I 
believe I consumed just as many as he did, or Coy 
either. 
HQ. And so if there was anything wrong with 
him, there would have been with you? 
HA. That's right. 
HQ. You can drink about the same amount he 
can, can't you? 
HA. If I don't drink anything else. 
HQ. Well, you two have been out drinking 
before. You know what capacity he has, don't you? 
ccA. Drank beer. 
HQ. I say, you have been drinking before with 
Mr. Milligan; you are friends. 
HA. Oh, yes, I've drank with Mr. Milligan 
before. 
HQ. And there have been times when you have 
gotten a little under the weather. So you know how 
much it takes, don't you? 
HA. Oh, yes. Yes. Yes. I'll say that, yes. 
HQ. And would you say that the two of you 
drink about the same; it takes about the same 
amount before you have any problem, like intoxi-
cation? 
HA. Well, as far as beer is concerned, I'll tell 
you the truth, I don't have any problem with beer 
at all. v 
HQ. Do you drink enough of it to know that? 
HA. Yes, I do. 
HQ. Would it be your testimony-
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((A. I've consumed a lot more beer than that 
ever would, I'll promise you that. 
((Q. Would it be your testimony you have 
never been drunk on beer? 
((A. That I've been drunk on beer? 
((Q. Yes. 
((A. You can get stupid on beer, if you get 
overloaded, I'll say that, yes. 
((Q. What's the difference between (stupid' and 
cdrunk'? 
((A. There's a Iotta difference. When you're 
drinking 3.2 beer, then you're drinking something 
else that's real hard, why, there's a lot of difference 
between being stupid and drunk. 
((Q. What's the (stupid'? 
((A. I guess it puts you in a daze, as far as I 
know. 
((Q. Puts you in a kind of a daze, so you 
couldn't see plainly? 
((A. If you were drunk, yes. 
ceQ. Now, you'd never drive a car in that con-
dition, would you? 
ccA. No. Nobody else would. 
ceQ. You wouldn't get in the same car, would 
you? 
ccA.No. 
ceQ. And you wouldn't expect Mr. Milligan to? 
ccA. No. 
ceQ. Have you ever discussed that? 
ccA. Sure, we've often discussed it. I wouldn't 
get in with anybody, driving a car, that's drunk. 
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uQ. And especially if they had been drinking 
beer, and were stupid instead of just drunk? 
uA. If they were drinking beer, and I thought 
they were anywhere's near intoxicated, I wouldn't 
get in the car; or stupid, either. 
uQ. How many times have you had eight or ten 
beers in a period of-or eight or ten beers, plus two 
or three beers, in a period of three hours? Do that 
often? 
uA. How many? 
uQ. Yes. Do that often? 
((A. Well, yes. When you entertain yourself, I 
think if you go in and you don't even play, you can 
sit at the bar there and you can consume a beer in 
ten or fifteen minutes. I don't say you can't. If 
you're a real lush, why, you probably would con-
sume a dozen. 
uQ. Well, now, what is your definition of a 
lush? 
((A. Well, a lush is a heavy drinker. 
uQ. I see. And if a person were a lush, you 
could consume about twelve beers, as I understand 
it, in a period of three hours? 
((A. Oh, yes. Yes. I'd say yes. 
ttQ. You wouldn't do that unless you were a 
lush, is that right? 
ttA. No, I don't think you would. 
uQ. Mr. Finnegan, let's go back over this. 
Your testimony today is, and your testimony that 
you testified before to was that you had a beer, 
which is about a glass and a half, at dinner time. Is 
that right? 
((A. Well, can. 
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((Q. Yes. Then you had a few beers, two or 
three, while you were waiting for Mr. Harward, 
and that was at about ten o'clock at night, ten or 
ten-thirty is your testimony. Then when you 
played, started playing, you had eight or ten more. 
Do you consider yourself a lush? 
((A. No, I don't consider myself a lush." (Tr. 
89-92) 
Mr. Finnegan also testified that he was thrown out 
through the back door of the car as a result of the impact 
and that while on the ground in back of the truck he could 
see that the car was in the traveled portion of the road. 
The record shows that the police removed Mr. Finnegan 
from the back seat of the car and much to Mr. Finnegan's 
amazement, there was no back door on the car as it was a 
1954 Chevrolet two-door, not a four-door automobile. 
((BY MR. AADNESEN: 
uQ. What kind of a car did you say you were 
driving, Mr. Harward? 
((A. It's a '54 Chev. Del Rey, two-door. 
ceQ. That's a two-door, isn't it? 
uA. Yes. 
((Q. Doesn't have any rear doors in it. 
((A. No, sir. 
((Q. You have to climb in through the front 
seat? 
ccA. That is right. 
ceQ. The testimony that you have heard given 
by Mr. Finnegan, that he was thrown out of the 
rear door, is impossible, isn't it? 
ccA. Well, he was still in the car when I was 
taken out, sir. 
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(tQ. Yes. You never saw him on the ground 
anywhere, did you? 
(tA. No, I didn't. 
(tQ. And he was there, in behind the seat, all 
the time, wasn't he? 
(tA. He was at the time I was calling for help 
across the street. 
(tQ. And that was until the officers took you 
all out. 
uA. That is right. I was first out of the car." 
(Tr. 146) 
Here again the Court adequately summarized the 
testimony. 
((THE COURT: Both the Plaintiff Milligan 
and Mr. Finnegan, who were riding with Harward 
in his car at the time of the accident, knew Mr. 
Harward well. They had been with him considerable 
time in the early part of the night, playing pool 
with him, talking with him, and drinking beer with 
him. There are some differences in the statements of 
the three of them as to the amount of beer they 
drank that evening; but it isn't the amount of beer 
you drink, it's the effect of it, or the possible effect. 
((Finnegan said, (Of course, Harward was 
you drink, it's the effect of it, or the possible effect. 
drunk, was intoxicated.' The other guest said he 
didn't think Harward was intoxicated. But both of 
them knew Harward, they knew he had been drink-
ing all evening with them, drink for drink. They 
go and get into his car with him knowing that he's 
drinking intoxicants, and knowing that that in-
volves the risk expressly so provided by the statute. 
And the statute says that a person who does that 
assumes the risk of bad driving; and that if he were 
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driving in the car as a guest, he has the right and 
privilege, and should exercise it, to warn and cau-
tion the driver who has been drinking. Under those 
situations, the statute says the guest cannot assert 
a claim and recover a claim against the driver. And 
there is no dispute but what both Milligan and Fin-
negan were just guests in the car. 
ccso from that angle, that should dispose of the 
case." (Tr. 200-201) 
((Now, Milligan, the plaintiff, and Finnegan, 
the other guest in the car, had been with Harward 
a long time that evening, playing pool with him, 
drinking with him, over quite a period of time. 
They say they had all drank about the same rate 
and the same quantity. They were acquainted with 
Harward, they knew him, they knew his drinking 
habits; they knew he drank quite freely, especially 
with beer, and beer is an intoxicating liquor under 
the statute. They knew what he had been drinking 
that night, because they were with him, drinking 
with him. They knew as a matter of law that any 
man who drank that much beer in that much time 
is under the influence of intoxicating liquor; that 
it's unlawful for him to drive an automobile. So the 
statute says if you get yourself in that kind of a 
position, and get hurt by it, you have no relief 
against the owner of the car. You know the danger 
you are going into, and you shouldn't encourage it, 
you should frown away from it and protect your-
self." (Tr. 203-204) 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Court properly ruled 
in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff and not 
one shred of evidence exists in the record at any place to 
support the contentions of the plaintiff against the defend-
ants, Kenneth B. McDuffy and C. E. Lindsey. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
GRANT C. AADNESEN, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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